
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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505



National Intelligence Officers

NFAC 7892-80 / 4 December 1980 25X1

December 1980

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director of Central Intelligence (

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA:

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

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FROM:

Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Near East

and South Asia

SUBJECT:

Controversy over Hostage Negotiation Proposal

- 1. Action Requested. None; the following is for your information.
- 2. <u>Background</u>. The minutes from your meeting with Secretary Muskie point up some very serious disconnects between State and the CIA and perhaps others as to US strategy on the hostage issue. If the main objective of the current negotiating effort is simply to buy time, then clearly our proposal is at cross purposes. Secondly, our perception of "generalized" versus "detailed" response is obviously at variance with State's. Finally, State appears to be operating on the assumption that the Iranians were serious about the final passage of the Majles statement on conditions for release, which outlines a phased released based on US performance. Our proposal, on the other hand, was formed by an implied belief that a release of all 52 hostages at one time may be possible. 25X1 (I am inclined toward State's view on this; Bob Ames takes the latter position.)
- 3. In my view, the strategy of buying time in the hope of the Iranians becoming more desperate is based on wishful thinking and perhaps very faulty thinking. However, if this is the course endorsed by the President, I think we should simply put our proposal on the back burner and concentrate our efforts on convincing our State colleagues of the weaknesses in this approach. Should we fail in this perhaps we could contribute some ideas on how to make the Iranians "more desperate."

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5. Finally, I think thos	se of us at CIA working on this problem ghly our views on the prospects for a full
elease versus a phased one.	This issue is a key aspect for any negotiating
dministration.	e, be a question asked of us by the new
6. As I mentioned in our	r last meeting, consideration of what State
e a primary factor in our cal	ccept by way of suggestions from us should lculus. Unfortunately but understandably,
tate seems very defensive at	this point. A "circle of wagons" mentality the number of wagons are very few. Judging
y the ideas expressed by the	Secretary to you, State negotiators may not
nterpretations of the Iranian	resh ideas or changing, and hopefully improved, ns' posture on the hostage issue. Hammering
way with our ideas through the s, if State remains unrecepti	he PDB may be the only productive avenue for ive.
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	NFAC 7892-80 4 December 1980
MEMORANDUM 1	OR: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT:	Controversy over Hostage Negotiation Proposal
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